A Russia-aligned threat group used a “half-click” exploit against Microsoft Exchange’s Outlook Web Access to install a browser-based backdoor when recipients opened specially crafted emails.
The campaign began on July 22 and was conducted by TA488, which is also tracked as Void Blizzard and Laundry Bear, according to a report from the cybersecurity firm Proofpoint.
The attacks targeted government organizations in the US and Europe, as well as companies in the telecommunications, financial, hospitality, and aerospace sectors. Proofpoint did not name the targeted organizations or say how many attacks resulted in successful compromises.
The attackers exploited CVE-2026-42897, a cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by inadequate sanitization of HTML in email bodies. A recipient did not have to click a link or open an attachment. Viewing a crafted message in OWA allowed malicious JavaScript to execute inside the browser.
Microsoft has previously said the flaw affects all update levels of Exchange Server 2016 and 2019, as well as Exchange Server Subscription Edition, while Exchange Online is not affected. The company disclosed the vulnerability on May 14 and issued an emergency mitigation before releasing a code fix in June. Microsoft later said customers who installed its July 2026 Exchange security update could remove the earlier mitigation.
Proofpoint found that infrastructure associated with the campaign had been created in March, before Microsoft disclosed the vulnerability. The company said the timeline made it feasible that TA488 had used the flaw as a zero-day, although it did not confirm that such exploitation occurred.
“TA488 used intentionally vague message lures with no call-to-action for the targeted user,” Proofpoint said. The messages resembled routine informational updates, including material on supply chains and market indicators. Opening one in OWA triggered OWAReaper, a previously undocumented JavaScript implant that runs inside the reading pane.
OWAReaper removes the exploit code from the message stored on the Exchange server after execution, reducing the evidence visible to users and investigators. It can collect account information and attempt to capture credentials entered through browser autofill.
If OWAReaper finds an Outlook add-in with ReadWriteMailbox permissions, it can use the add-in to obtain an OAuth token and grant owner-level access to Exchange’s built-in “Default” identity. This could allow an attacker controlling another authenticated account in the organization to continue accessing the victim’s mail folders.
Because those permissions are stored on the Exchange server, changing the victim’s password or rebuilding the endpoint would not remove them.
Mailbox persistence
OWAReaper shifts incident response beyond the affected device because the attacker can establish persistence within Exchange itself, said Sakshi Grover, senior research manager for IDC Asia Pacific Cybersecurity Services.
“The most important shift is where the attacker establishes persistence,” she said.
Organizations should treat the compromise as a server-side identity incident rather than only an infected endpoint or stolen password, said Keith Prabhu, founder and CEO of Confidis.
“The normal incident response is usually to reset the password, revoke tokens, and reimage the endpoint,” Prabhu said. “This may no longer be sufficient.”
Detection blind spots
Security tools focused on endpoint files or processes may fail to identify an implant operating inside the OWA browser session, Prabhu said.
“Traditional email-security controls may also struggle because the delivery emails contain no obvious malicious attachment or conventional phishing link,” Grover said.
Because OWAReaper operates within an authenticated OWA session and can abuse legitimate mailbox functions, individual events may not appear malicious when examined in isolation.
Detecting the threat requires cross-layer correlation, Prabhu said. He recommended starting with users that opened suspicious OWA messages, then reviewing subsequent mailbox-permission changes, add-in activity, and OAuth events. Investigators should also examine browser-storage artifacts and related network metadata.
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