{"id":9382,"date":"2026-09-09T18:27:17","date_gmt":"2026-09-09T18:27:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/?p=9382"},"modified":"2026-09-09T18:27:17","modified_gmt":"2026-09-09T18:27:17","slug":"why-internal-attack-surface-management-needs-continuous-network-visibility","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/?p=9382","title":{"rendered":"Why Internal Attack Surface Management Needs Continuous Network Visibility"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tStatic inventories confirm asset existence, but continuous visibility reveals real-time security risks, active behavior, and lateral movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRapid enterprise shifts, such as unmonitored cloud sprawl, third-party access, and shadow IT, outpace periodic network audits.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tShrinking attacker dwell times make traditional point-in-time scanning insufficient for catching internal breaches early.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tInternal attack surface management requires six functions: discover, classify, assess, observe, validate, and respond.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIntegrating bidirectional traffic monitoring bridges the critical gap between finding assets and validating their ongoing safety.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDeception actively reshapes what an attacker can see and reach, letting a program manipulate and validate exposure instead of just detecting, assessing, prioritizing, and remediating it.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Most security teams know what\u2019s sitting on their perimeter. Fewer of them can say with any confidence what their internal assets are doing right now, today, while nobody\u2019s watching. This article is about that gap, and why closing it takes more than a better inventory.<\/p>\n

A fully known asset can still be dangerous. A server can be documented in the CMDB, patched on schedule, and rated low risk, and it can still turn into a launch pad for lateral movement the moment its credentials get stolen somewhere else. An inventory tells you the server exists. It doesn\u2019t tell you whether it\u2019s currently safe, and that second question is the one internal attack surface management has to keep asking.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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ASM and Network Visibility Are Related, Not Identical<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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These two terms get used almost interchangeably in vendor pitches. They shouldn\u2019t be, so here\u2019s the distinction.<\/p>\n

Attack surface management, or ASM, is the discipline of finding, classifying, and reducing exposure across an organization\u2019s digital assets. External attack surface management, or EASM<\/a>, applies that discipline to what\u2019s visible from outside: exposed domains, internet-facing systems, and public cloud services that someone running a scan from the outside could stumble onto without much effort.<\/p>\n

Internal ASM turns the same lens inward, toward internal systems, service accounts, and the connections between them, and tries to answer a fairly basic question: what do we actually have, and how exposed is it.<\/p>\n

Continuous network visibility<\/a> answers a related but different question. Rather than cataloging what exists, it watches how those assets communicate over time: where traffic moves, when behavior starts to look different from what\u2019s normal for that asset. A good ASM program gives you the map, and continuous visibility tells you if anything on that map is currently doing something it shouldn\u2019t, since a map that isn\u2019t checked against real traffic can quickly become stale before anyone realizes what has changed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Internal vs. External Attack Surface: Two Different Problems<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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External ASM covers what an attacker can find from outside looking in, things like exposed domains, APIs, and cloud resources sitting in plain view on the public internet. Closing that kind of gap matters on its own and shouldn\u2019t be treated as a lesser priority just because it\u2019s the more familiar half of the problem.<\/p>\n

Internal ASM picks up once an attacker, a careless employee, or a compromised vendor account gets past that outer edge. At that point the internal attack surface becomes every system, credential, and connection that could carry them further into the environment, including internal assets, service-to-service traffic, and the web applications and databases that were never designed to face the public internet at all.<\/p>\n

External visibility alone won\u2019t catch what happens after that point. Some intrusions do start at the edge, through an exposed asset or a phished credential, but once that first foothold is established the risk that matters most has already moved inside, and seeing it requires a different kind of visibility than an external scan can provide.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Why the Internal Attack Surface Keeps Growing<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Enterprise environments used to be easier to represent as a fairly static list of servers and applications, mostly because there just wasn\u2019t as much to keep track of. Not anymore.<\/p>\n

Cloud environments spin resources up and down constantly. A developer provisions a database instance for a two-week project and forgets to decommission it once the project wraps. A business unit signs up for a SaaS tool without looping in IT because the approval process takes too long. A contractor gets VPN access for a single engagement and somehow still has it a year later. Each of these can leave behind another asset, identity, or connection sitting inside systems that security teams are nominally responsible for protecting, whether anyone remembers it\u2019s there or not.<\/p>\n

Third-party integrations add to the problem. Vendors, managed service providers, and partner APIs all get some form of access into internal systems, and that access rarely gets reviewed as often as it should.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\tThe 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report found that third parties were involved in 48% of breaches, a 60% increase over the prior year.\t\t\t<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Then there\u2019s the human side of it: employee credentials, shadow IT<\/a> adopted because the approved tool was too slow, personal devices that connected to the network without ever going through IT review. None of that is unusual. It\u2019s just what running a real business on real infrastructure looks like by 2026, and it\u2019s a big part of why the internal attack surface rarely holds still long enough for a quarterly audit to actually catch up with it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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What Blind Spots Cost<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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It\u2019s tempting to file unknown assets under general housekeeping. The numbers suggest that\u2019s the wrong instinct.<\/p>\n

In a global study of more than 2,000 cybersecurity leaders, 73% had dealt with a security incident tied directly to an unknown or unmanaged asset, and 91% said attack surface risk was connected to overall business risk. Only 43% actually used a dedicated tool to manage that risk on an ongoing basis.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s also the question of speed once an attacker is in. Google Cloud\u2019s Mandiant M-Trends 2026 report, built on more than 500,000 hours of frontline incident response<\/a> work, found that the median time between initial access and the handoff to a secondary threat group, often a ransomware affiliate, dropped to 22 seconds in 2025, down from more than eight hours back in 2022. The same report put global median dwell time at 14 days, up from 11 the year before, numbers that leave little room for a security team relying on periodic checks to catch what\u2019s happening in between.<\/p>\n

IBM\u2019s 2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report attaches a dollar figure to that delay: a global average of $4.99 million per breach, with AI-enabled attacks<\/a> running closer to $6 million, a category that grew 56% year over year. Those costs reflect what happens after an attacker is already inside, in the part of the environment continuous visibility is meant to help monitor.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Five Ways You Can Use Deception in the Mythos-like AI Era<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tGenerates High-Confidence Alerts<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDisrupts Autonomous and AI-Assisted Attacks<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tExtends Detection Across Hybrid Environments<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRead the Guide Now<\/span>
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The Key Challenges Internal ASM Programs Run Into<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Ask most security teams why their internal attack surface management program isn\u2019t further along, and you\u2019ll hear some version of the same handful of answers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Asset discovery never really finishes<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Keeping an up-to-date inventory of internal assets sounds achievable on paper. Then you factor in how quickly cloud resources, containers, and shadow SaaS accounts actually multiply. A discovery scan run last quarter is already stale by the time anyone reads the results, and some assets never get formally discovered at all.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Lateral movement hides inside traffic that’s already considered trusted<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Once an attacker is inside, they rely on east-west movement between systems that already trust each other by design. Most internal traffic was never built with the assumption that anyone would be watching it closely, and tools designed to watch the perimeter usually aren\u2019t looking at this kind of movement at all, which is exactly what makes it so hard to catch.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Encrypted internal traffic limits context more than it limits threats<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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A large share of internal traffic today is encrypted by default. Encryption protects what\u2019s inside a session, but it can also reduce the amount of context available to a security team if the inspection tooling in place isn\u2019t designed to work with encrypted traffic<\/a>. Losing that context makes it harder to tell ordinary internal communication apart from something worth a closer look, even when flow data, timing, and destination metadata are technically still available.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Third-party and vendor access rarely gets revisited once it’s granted<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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A contractor\u2019s VPN credential or an API key handed to a partner three years ago is still, technically speaking, a valid way into the network. Very few organizations have a standing process for continuously checking whether those connections should still exist.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The human attack surface resists automation.<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Insider risk, whether it comes from negligence or something more deliberate, doesn\u2019t necessarily show up on an asset inventory at all. It shows up in behavior instead, which means catching it means watching activity over time, not scanning a list of IP addresses once a month.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Existing security tools weren’t necessarily built to talk to each other. <\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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EDR<\/a> watches what happens on endpoints. Vulnerability management flags known weaknesses. A CASB might catch some amount of SaaS sprawl. None of them were built to share context with the others, so security teams end up stitching together partial pictures, and the gaps form right in the seams between the tools.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Why Point-in-Time Scans Aren’t Enough<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Traditional attack surface management still leans heavily on scanning: run a discovery job, generate a list of discovered assets, flag identified vulnerabilities<\/a>, move on to the next task. That approach works reasonably well for something like a website that doesn\u2019t change much from month to month. It works far less well for an internal network, where new assets and new connections show up on a near-daily basis.<\/p>\n

Continuous network visibility works from a different premise. Instead of asking what the attack surface<\/a> looked like the last time anyone checked, it asks what\u2019s happening on the network right now and whether that looks different from what would normally be expected. It\u2019s the difference between finding a compromised internal system a quarter later during a routine audit, and catching the same compromise while it\u2019s still trying to move laterally.<\/p>\n

CISA has made a similar argument in its own guidance to federal agencies, framing continuous, well-instrumented network monitoring as foundational to catching threats as they happen rather than reconstructing them well after the fact. The reasoning behind it applies just as well outside government networks.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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A Working Model for Internal ASM<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Rather than treating internal attack surface management as a single tool or a single checklist item, it\u2019s more useful to think of it as six connected functions, each one answering a different question.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDiscover:
Find the assets, services, and connections that make up the environment, including the ones that never made it into a CMDB in the first place.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tClassify:
Establish ownership, business role, exposure, and criticality for each asset found, since not every discovered asset carries the same level of risk.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAssess:
Identify vulnerabilities and risky configurations tied to those assets, and feed that directly into vulnerability management<\/a> and remediation efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tObserve:
Continuously monitor how those assets communicate and behave, watching for east-west traffic patterns<\/a>, lateral movement, and activity that doesn’t match what’s expected of that asset.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tValidate:
Test whether the security controls already in place actually hold up under pressure, using penetration testing and breach and attack simulation to confirm assumptions rather than assume they’re correct.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRespond:
Automate containment once suspicious behavior appears, so the gap between detection and action stays as short as it can reasonably be.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Discovery, classification, and assessment are where traditional ASM tooling spends most of its effort. Observation and response are where continuous network visibility does its work instead, and it\u2019s where a tool like Fidelis Network<\/a>\u00ae fits most naturally into the rest of the stack.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Where Fidelis Network\u00ae Fits<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Continuous network visibility becomes a meaningful complement to internal attack surface management here, not a stand-in for it. Fidelis Network\u00ae supplies that layer, watching internal traffic bidirectionally, east-west and north-south, so the assets that discovery tools have already identified can actually be observed doing something over time instead of just sitting in a list.<\/p>\n

Most internal ASM tooling stops at four steps: detect, assess, prioritize, and remediate. Fidelis adds a step most vendors don\u2019t have in between. Fidelis Deception<\/a>\u00ae lets a team manipulate and validate the attack surface itself, deploying decoys and breadcrumbs that alter what an attacker can see and reach, so a given exposure gets confirmed as reachable and watched rather than assumed handled.<\/p>\n

Detect, assess, prioritize, manipulate, and validate, then remediate. Fidelis Network\u00ae and Fidelis Deception\u00ae are separate components of the Fidelis Elevate<\/a>\u00ae XDR platform, correlated together through Active Threat Detection, which is how the two connect in practice.<\/p>\n

That combination breaks down into five capabilities:<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAutomated Cyber Terrain Mapping:
Fidelis Deception\u00ae continuously maps the internal environment and calculates asset risk<\/a> to determine where an adversary is most likely to strike next, using machine learning to adapt decoy and breadcrumb placement as that risk picture changes, rather than working from a static asset list.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tContinuous Asset Discovery and Classification:
Unknown or unmanaged assets still have to communicate with something in order to function, even if they were never formally inventoried. Fidelis Network\u00ae observes that traffic directly and classifies what it finds, rather than depending on a list that’s likely already out of date by the time anyone consults it.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRisk-Based Vulnerability and Exposure Prioritization:
Findings get ranked by what’s actually reachable and exposed in the live environment, not just a static severity score, so remediation effort goes where the real risk is.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tInternal Attack Path and Active Directory Visibility:
Fidelis Active Directory Intercept<\/a> combines AD-aware network detection and response, integrated AD deception, and foundational AD log and event monitoring into one layer, using Deep Session Inspection<\/a> to catch threats hidden inside nested and obfuscated files moving across the wire.
It gives full visibility into AD objects, resources, and access paths, and detects the AD-specific attacks that log-only tools typically miss, including reconnaissance, Kerberoasting, DCSync and DCShadow attacks, LLMNR poisoning, and extraction of DPAPI domain backup keys, then maps confirmed threats to MITRE ATT&CK TTPs.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDeception-Driven Attack Surface Validation and Manipulation :
This is the step other ASM approaches don’t have. Fidelis Deception\u00ae deploys decoys and breadcrumbs across hardware, software, cloud, and AD assets, turning reconnaissance into a high-confidence alert the moment something interacts with them, since there’s no legitimate reason for any real user or process to touch a decoy in the first place. Red Team and Blue Team risk simulations continually tune where those decoys and breadcrumbs sit, and Active Threat Detection correlates deception activity with Fidelis Network\u00ae, Fidelis Endpoint<\/a>\u00ae, and Sandbox alerts to confirm whether existing controls actually catch the interaction.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Catch the Threats that Other Tools Miss<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDetect and Correlate Weak Signals<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tActive Threat Detection<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEvaluate Findings Against Known Attack Vectors<\/span><\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tProactively Secure Systems<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDownload Now<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>
\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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None of this makes Fidelis Network\u00ae or Fidelis Deception\u00ae an attack surface management platform in place of a team\u2019s existing ASM tooling. Together, as components of Fidelis Elevate<\/a>\u00ae, they\u2019re the layer that lets a program go past finding and ranking exposure into actually reshaping what an attacker can see, confirming what\u2019s really at risk, and watching how the assets ASM already found and classified are behaving in practice.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The Bottom Line<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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External attack surface management tells you what the internet can see. Getting that same level of confidence inside the network means pairing internal ASM with continuous visibility, so security teams can see how assets communicate, when that behavior shifts, and where an attacker could move next if given the chance. Together, the two turn a static inventory into something closer to an active view of the internal attack surface.<\/p>\n

Knowing which assets exist isn\u2019t the same as knowing whether they\u2019re currently safe. That distinction is what separates an internal ASM program that looks good on paper from one a security team can actually rely on when something goes wrong.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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What is internal attack surface management?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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Internal attack surface management is the ongoing process of discovering, classifying, and assessing exposure across the assets, systems, and connections inside an organization\u2019s network, as opposed to only the internet-facing assets covered by external attack surface management.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

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How is internal ASM different from external attack surface management (EASM)?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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EASM focuses on what an attacker can see and reach from outside the network, things like exposed domains, internet-facing assets, and public cloud services. Internal ASM picks up from there, covering internal asset sprawl, third-party access, and what happens once someone, or something, is already inside the network.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

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Is continuous network visibility the same thing as attack surface management?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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No. ASM discovers, classifies, and assesses assets. Continuous network visibility observes how those assets communicate and behave over time. They answer different questions, and an internal ASM program works best when both are running rather than relying on one to stand in for the other.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

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Why do unknown or forgotten assets keep showing up on networks that are supposedly well managed?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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Because modern IT environments change faster than periodic audits are able to track. Cloud resources get spun up for short-term projects, shadow IT tools get adopted without formal approval, and vendor access gets granted and then rarely revisited. Continuous discovery and observation keep pace with that rate of change in a way a scheduled audit can\u2019t.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

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Does continuous network visibility replace endpoint detection and response (EDR)?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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No. EDR watches activity on managed endpoints. Continuous network visibility covers traffic and assets that fall outside what EDR agents usually monitor, including unmanaged devices and the network sessions between systems, often where lateral movement actually happens.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

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How often should an internal asset inventory actually be refreshed?<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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As close to continuously as the environment allows. A quarterly or even monthly refresh will lag behind how quickly cloud resources, service accounts, and third-party connections change, and that lag is exactly the gap continuous observation is meant to close.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Citations:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t^<\/a>2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report<\/a>^<\/a>IBM Newsroom, July 29, 2026<\/a>^<\/a>2026 Data Breach Investigations Report<\/a>^<\/a>M-Trends 2026<\/a>^<\/a>Logging Reference Architecture<\/a>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The post Why Internal Attack Surface Management Needs Continuous Network Visibility<\/a> appeared first on Fidelis Security<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Key Takeaways Static inventories confirm asset existence, but continuous visibility reveals real-time security risks, active behavior, and lateral movement. Rapid enterprise shifts, such as unmonitored cloud sprawl, third-party access, and shadow IT, outpace periodic network audits. Shrinking attacker dwell times make traditional point-in-time scanning insufficient for catching internal breaches early. Internal attack surface management requires […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":9383,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9382","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9382"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=9382"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9382\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/9383"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=9382"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=9382"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cybersecurityinfocus.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=9382"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}